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Abstract
There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced 
only by the economic needs of the borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF 
may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, 
differentiating between concessional and nonconcessional facilities. To carry out the 
empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles proxies for geopolitical 
importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990–2003, focusing on emerging and developing 
economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of 
countries' geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to 
account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for 
economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence 
notably lending decisions when loans are nonconcessional, whereas results are less robust 
and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to 
the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending 
decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility. 
Keywords: factor analysis, geopolitics, International Monetary Fund, potential analysis 
JEL Classification: F33, H77, O19 5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper explores the hypothesis that some countries have “a geopolitical interest in 
diverting the IMF from the principles that normally governs its provision of financial 
support” (Mussa, 2002). 
The IMF has recently been subject to particularly fierce criticism as many have 
argued that the institution is failing to fulfil its main objectives: The provision of 
emergency finance for the resolution of balance of payment crises and the 
surveillance of the world economy. Many of the problems the IMF is facing are 
rooted in its governance structure since the Fund is dominated by a rather narrow 
group of advanced economies. Accordingly, the governance issues raise questions 
regarding the fair distribution of IMF loans. 
A large number of academic studies have then examined the determinants of the 
IMF’s lending decisions. In the first half of the 1990s, researchers focused on the 
economic determinants of IMF loans (Joyce, 1992; Conway, 1994; Bird, 1995; and 
Knight and Santaella, 1997). In the second half of the 1990s, others have focused on 
other determinants such as political ones (Edwards and Santaella, 1993; Thacker, 
1999; Vreeland, 1999; Bird and Rowlands, 2000; Przeworksi and Vreeland, 2000; 
Dreher and Vaubel, 2000; Vreeland, 2001; Dreher, 2004; Barro and Lee, 2005; Sturm 
et al., 2005; Harrigan et al., 2006; and Steinwand and Stone for a survey, 2007). 
Our contribution is to define the concept and relevance of geopolitics in the context of 
the IMF and to investigate its influence on IMF lending. We collected and built 
various indicators that, according to the related literature, are subjects of geopolitical 
stakes. As Baldwin (1979) argues, there is no unique geopolitical variable. Indeed, 
geopolitics may concern many different areas, thereby implying that, depending on 
the area, the same country’s geopolitical importance may switch from the highest to 
an insignificant level. Consequently, the geopolitical importance of a country is an 
unobservable variable. Nevertheless, it is possible to statistically extract the 
underlying factor of commonly known determinants of geopolitical importance and to 
capture its distribution over the globe. In a first step, we identify relevant geopolitical 
determinants and extract the underlying factor. In the second step, inspired by 
economic geography’s recent findings (see Hanson, 2005), we compute a geopolitical 
potential, in the spirit of the Harris potential, by taking the country’s geopolitical 
factor and the sum of others countries geopolitical factor over their relative distance. 
This technique allows us to have a geographical coverage when judging a country’s 
geopolitical importance. In the third and last step, we estimate a function of IMF 
loans distinguishing between concessional facilities, i.e. the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF), and non-concessional facilities supported by the General 
Resources Account (GRA). This distinction is crucial since these facilities are most of 
the time pooled together in related studies. Yet, these loans are very different in terms 
of financial conditions but also in terms of conditionality and overall objective. 
Our results provide empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are 
an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions. Economic determinants are still 
valid for both facilities and turn out to play a bigger role for GRA. This is in a sense a 
reassuring result, since non-concessional facilities are very large loans. Moreover, we 
show that the Fund favoured geopolitically important countries when lending non-
concessional facilities while concessional ones tend to be attributed to non-
geopolitically important countries. Finally, we find evidence that the Fund is also 
favouring countries that are geographically close to geopolitically important 
countries.6
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1. Introduction
“Some large IMF-supported programs raise concerns because they appear to suggest 
that a country's geopolitical importance [...] plays a role in IMF loan decisions”, de 
Rato y Figaredo, IMF Managing Director between June 2004 and October 2007 
(IMF, 2004). 
“It is important to recognize that when geopolitical considerations weigh heavily, the 
IMF tends to be diverted from the principles that normally govern its provision of 
financial support”, Mussa, IMF Economic Counsellor and Director of the 
Department of Research from 1991 to 2001 (IMF, 2002). 
Several Institutions were created after World War II in order to provide 
international public goods and deal with political and economic issues on a 
multilateral basis. More recently, the process of globalization has further underlined 
the usefulness of some of these organizations. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that the 
maintenance of international financial stability and global policy issues call for 
enhanced international cooperation. 
The transfer of sovereignty from the country level to the international level has 
created tensions, however. Jackson (2003) argues that “in some of these 
circumstances (…) a powerful tension is generated between traditional core 
“sovereignty”, on the one hand, and the international institution, on the other hand”. 
This may be partly due to the fact that the multilateral approach has not always 
respected the principle of equal treatment (Mavroidis, 2000). Indeed, it is widely 
accepted that decision-making in international organizations tends to be dominated by 
a few large countries (see Stiglitz, 2002; and Vreeland, 2007; for a recent literature 
review on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bown, 2005; Shoyer, 2003; and 
Steinberg, 2004; regarding the World Trade Organization (WTO)). First, the powers, 
i.e. quotas or voting shares, are not always equitably apportioned relative to country 
size. Second, some countries have means to influence others, and can then divert 
international organizations from their initial commitments. Steinberg (2004), for 
example, emphasizes the ongoing debate around the good functioning of the WTO 
dispute settlement body. He distinguishes studies that argue that the new system 
favours powerful members and encourages them to adopt a “rule breaking behaviour”, 
from those arguing that the new system prevents these countries from behaving in 
such a way. Whatever the point of view, both assume that powerful members tend to 7
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divert the institution from its governing principles, at the expense of other members, 
by using their relative economic size. 
The IMF has recently been subject to particularly fierce criticisms. Many have 
argued that the institution is failing to fulfil its main objectives, namely the provision 
of emergency finance for the resolution of balance of payment crises and the 
surveillance of the world economy. Many of the problems the IMF is facing are 
rooted in its governance structure since the Fund is also dominated by a rather narrow 
group of advanced economies. According to Truman (2006), the IMF is enduring an 
“identity crisis” mainly caused by the imbalance of power among its members. As a 
result there are indications that a number of its members have lost faith in the 
institution.
These governance issues raise questions regarding the fair distribution of IMF loans. 
A large number of academic studies have examined the determinants of the IMF's 
lending decisions. In the first half of the 1990s, researchers have focused on the 
economic determinants of IMF loans (Joyce, 1992; Conway, 1994; Bird, 1995; and 
Knight and Santaella, 1997), while in the second half of the 1990s, others have 
focused on other determinants, such as political ones (Edwards and Santaella, 1993; 
Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 1999; Bird and Rowlands, 2000; Przeworski and Vreeland, 
2000; Vreeland, 2001; Dreher and Vaubel, 2004; Dreher, 2004; Joyce, 2004; Barro 
and Lee, 2005; Sturm et al., 2005 and Harrigan et al., 2006; and Steinwand and Stone 
for a survey, 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that some countries have “a 
geopolitical interest in diverting [the IMF] from the principles that normally govern 
its provision of financial support” (Mussa, ibid, and de Rato y Figaredo, ibid). To that 
end, the paper studies the geopolitical importance of loans recipients. After defining 
the concept and relevance of geopolitics in the context of an international organization 
with a particular focus on the IMF, we collected and built various indicators that, 
according to related literature, are subjects of geopolitical stakes. As Baldwin (1979) 
argues, there is no unique geopolitical variable. Indeed, geopolitics may concern 
many different areas, thus inducing that, regarding on the area, the same country's 
geopolitical importance may switch from the highest to an insignificant level.
1
Consequently, the geopolitical importance of a country is an unobservable variable. 
1 Baldwin argues that “Planes loaded with nuclear weapons may strengthen a state's ability to deter 
nuclear attacks but may be irrelevant to rescuing the Pueblo on short notice.” (p. 164). 8
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Nevertheless, it is possible to statistically extract the underlying factor of commonly 
known determinants of geopolitical importance of countries and to capture its 
distribution over the globe. We therefore proceed as follows: in a first step, we 
identify geopolitical determinants that may influence the distribution of IMF loans 
and extract the underlying factor of a larger range of these factors. In a second step, 
inspired by recent findings from economic geography (see Hanson, 2005), we 
compute a geopolitical potential à la Harris by taking the country's geopolitical factor 
and the sum of other countries’ geopolitical factors weighted by their geographical 
distances. We also compute what we call a pure geopolitical potential of country's 
geopolitical importance by taking only into account the geopolitical geographic 
situation of the country (i.e. without taking into account its own geopolitical factor but 
only that of its neighbours over their distance). Using this technique allows us to have 
a full geographical coverage when judging of a country's geopolitical importance. In a 
third and last step, in line with existing literature, we estimate a standard model of 
determination of IMF loans distinguishing between concessional facilities, i.e. the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and non-concessional facilities 
supported by the General Resources Account (GRA). Regarding the latter, we focus 
on Stand-By Agreements (SBAs) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) which share the 
largest part of overall IMF financing. This distinction is crucial since these facilities 
are different in terms of financial conditions and overall objectives. Yet, they are 
sometime pooled together in related studies or researchers focus only on GRA 
agreements. Since we focus on lending, and given that no industrial country has made 
use of the Fund's financial support for the last three decades, our panel comprises 107 
IMF developing and emerging economies over the period 1990–2003 sampled at the 
yearly frequency. 
Our results provide empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations 
are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions. Economic and political 
determinants are still valid for both facilities and turn out to be more influential for 
SBA. Moreover, we show that the Fund favoured geopolitically important countries 
when lending non-concessional facilities. However, concessional loans tend to be 
attributed to non-geopolitically important countries, although to a lesser extent. 
Indeed, according to the literature on aid determinants, it is because bilateral aid flows 
are mainly determined by political and geopolitical determinants that international 
institutions have settled multilateral aid arrangements to support non strategic 9
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countries that would not received bilateral aid otherwise (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
Overall, our results pass a large number of robustness checks including controlling for 
recidivism, and other econometrical specification of the factor analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the 
understanding of geopolitics, and its role within the IMF. Section 3 explains the 
choice of variables and the techniques. Section 4 describes the data and discusses 
methodological issues. Section 5 exposes the empirical results and the robustness 
checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Geopolitics and International Organizations: What about the IMF? 
There is a vast literature on the economic and political determinants of IMF lending 
decisions (see also section 4 below). However, the question of whether some 
countries may have a geopolitical interest in shaping the Fund’s decisions has, to our 
best knowledge, received much less attention. In this paper, we put forward the 
hypothesis that leading members of international organizations use the institution’s 
prerogatives to increase or serve their influence over other members for geopolitical 
purposes. Boughton (2004) supported the view that IMF involvement in the Eastern 
European countries was not purely financially driven, but rather ideological by 
ultimately encouraging the superiority of the market economy. In the same vein, 
Marchesi and Sabani (2007) show that because of the lack of credibility of the Fund, 
i.e. regarding the borrowing country’s non-compliance with conditionality, lending 
may be distorted for reputation issues. As a result, creditors (i.e. the G7 members) 
may use the Funds’ financing facilities to increase or serve their influence over 
debtors.
Diverting the IMF, for geopolitical purposes, from its principles to serve particular 
interest is possible since decisions to lend are taken by the Executive Board (the 
Board). The Board is responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the IMF. 
It is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or 
by groups of countries, and the Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman. The 
Board usually meets several times a week and carries out its work largely on the basis 
of papers prepared by IMF staff. Decisions are officially voted, but in practice, 
Directors never vote. The Chairman evaluates the positions of Directors following 
their interventions and passes a decision when a consensus seems to be reached. 10
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Therefore, it is straightforward that, if some countries are better negotiators or have 
means to influence others, they can succeed in influencing the Board’s decisions. 
Alonso-Meijide and Bowles (2005), Bini Smaghi (2004, 2006a, 2006b), Leech (2002) 
and Reynaud et al. (2007) have illustrated this using voting power indices derived 
from cooperative game theory and found that the US and the Group of 7 are over 
influential at the Board. 
Therefore, in studying the determinants of IMF loans, researchers have focused on 
particular factors that might be of interests for leading IMF members. For example, 
Thacker (1999) found that a move towards the US position of the borrowing country 
is positively related to the probability of receiving a loan. Oatley and Yackee (2000) 
found that the more US banks are exposed in the borrowing country, the larger the 
loan. Finally, Oatley (2002) found that commercial bank debt of G7 countries into the 
borrowing country influences the size of the loan. 
Others have focused on country specificities such as political stability (Edwards and 
Santaella, 1993), political freedom (Rowlands, 1995) and democracy indicators 
(Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 1999; Dreher and Vaubel, 2004). They found that the more 
borrowing countries are close to cultural and political standards in developed 
countries, the higher the probability to receive IMF funds. 
More recently, IMF staff has argued that some members are influencing the 
distribution of loans because of particular geopolitical interest in the borrowing 
country. We begin by introducing hereafter a rather heuristic definition of geopolitics: 
“Geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between 
political power and geographic space; in concrete terms it is often seen as a body 
of thought assaying specific strategic prescriptions based on the relative 
importance of land power” (Osterud, 1988). 
Geopolitics has then to be related to the importance of land power: the size, the 
position in the World, the resources that are natural and built by man. The conversion 
of ‘land power’ into ‘political power’ is however not straightforward. In the context of 
International Politics, Baldwin (1979) and Nye (1990) developed the following 
seminal argument: 
“Some countries are better in converting their resources into effective influence, 
just as some skilled card players win despite weak hands” (Nye, 1990)11
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This idea, already mentioned by Baldwin (1979) as one of the two reasons
2
explaining “the paradox of unrealized power”, refers to the fact that a country with 
resources identified as strategic does not necessarily succeed in being powerful. 
According to Baldwin, this country has the resources but has not the knowledge to use 
it in order to convert them into power. Similarly, some countries have no resources 
but have means to convert strategic resources into power. Then, the latter are 
interested in using resources of the former. A good example is the importance of oil 
reserves. Indeed, these reserves do not provide wealth at the moment but may in the 
future. Moreover, they may provide wealth and thus political power at the domestic 
level if they are exploited domestically; but could also be appropriated externally and 
lead to a misdistribution of wealth, i.e. corruption (see the literature on the resource 
curse: among others Leite and Weidmann, 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003; Isham et al., 2004; Mehlum et al., 2006; and Dietz et al. 2007). However, these 
reserves provide geopolitical power as of today since most (of industrial) economies 
are dependent and do not posses large initial endowments.
3 Finally, there is a last 
group of countries, mainly those that have both the know-how and the resources (or 
the control of other countries’ resources). They represent the dominant countries and 
try to maintain this domination by protecting other countries’ resources. The fact that 
they dominate has allowed them to obtain a great importance in the (recently created) 
International Organizations. Indeed, as argued by Popke (1994), the role of the IMF 
“has increasingly come to be scripted through the discourse of US security”. 
Moreover, “the IMF itself draws on discourses, in order to script the role of the 
countries with which it interacts (…). The IMF disseminates a form of 
power/knowledge by casting itself as the sole authority over a wide range of issues”. 
Popke finally argues that this power influence also IMF’s surveillance and structural 
adjustment programs.
4 The aim is therefore to deflect “blame for monetary problems 
away from the industrialized nations and onto the nations of the third world”. 
This leads to the idea that IMF loans, the country chosen, the amount lent and the 
level of conditionality of loans could be used by creditors to control or to appropriate 
strategic resources from debtors. The distinction between the use and the possession 
2 The other one is the already mentioned bad estimation of what creates power. 
3 We do not focus on the measurement of country’s ability to transform strategic resources into 
effective power. Also, we believe that this could be of some interest to study it in correspondence with 
the ability of this country to be listening in international fora. 
4 See Fratzscher and Reynaud (2008) for a study on the influence of political power on IMF 
surveillance. 12
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of resources is then representative of what makes the difference between politics and 
geopolitics, and justifies the hypothesis just above. The objective of this paper is first, 
to identify what factors could make some countries geopolitically attractive to IMF 
creditors and second to assess empirically whether these factors influence the 
probability to receive IMF financial support. 
3 Geopolitical determinants of the importance of nations 
3.1 Methodological issues 
In this section we attempt to identify relevant proxies for some of the key factors 
that determine the geopolitical importance of nations. Listing all the sources of 
geopolitical importance is a difficult task. The search for determinants of country’s 
geopolitical importance faces in our view two main constraints. First, one should not 
search for a determinant, neither for some determinants, but rather for a range of 
interacting determinants. Indeed, as Baldwin (1979) argues, there is no unique 
geopolitical variable. Geopolitics may therefore concern many different areas. 
Keeping this in mind, we attempt to propose a statistical analysis of the geopolitical 
determinants which deals with this issue, namely a common factor analysis. Factor 
analysis is used to study the patterns of relationship among many variables, with the 
goal of discovering something about the nature of the underlying common factor that 
affects them, even though those variables were not measured directly. In our case, 
measuring directly the geopolitical importance of a country is not possible. In a factor 
analysis, this will refer to the inferred independent variable, i.e. the factor. In other 
words, factor analysis looks for the factors which underlie the variables. It is therefore 
useful for our study since we do not pretend to propose an absolute definition or an 
index of the geopolitical importance of countries, but rather extract an underlying 
factor behind a wider range of determinants as possible.
5 More formally, with xi an 
observation, the factor analysis states that, with i=1,2…,p:
1
k




  ¦ (1)
where fr is the common r-th vector, k is specified and ei is a residual that represents 
sources of variation affecting only xi. In other words, if a correlation matrix can be 
explained by a general factor, it will be true that there is some set of correlations of 
5 Proposing an index is inappropriate since it induces to arbitrary weight the variables entering it. 13
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the observed variables such that the product of any two of those correlations equals 
the correlation between the two observed variables. The method we used to estimate 
the geopolitical factor (gf) is the “regression estimator” (Thomson, 1951). Formally, it 
has the following form (Kosfield and Lauridsen, 2006): 
1 '' 1 ' ' 1 ' ' 2 () ( ) Tu u gf X I X
   / //6   /6 / / (2)
Where  / is the factor matrix, 
' /  is given by 
' F ;  /, with the left hand side 
being the matrix of the “true” regressor values. The matrix of observations X, is then 
given by the following equality: XU  ; , where U stands for the errors matrix. 
That is, if we refer to (1), it is the matrix of the ei. Finally, the last term to define is the 
covariance matrix of unique factors uj, given by: 
12
22 2 (. . . )
p uu u u diag V VV 6  . The product 
' //  is the cross-factors matrix of the / with each other. 
Regarding the structure of the factor, two questions arise: How many factors should 
we use? How many variables should we use? Darlington et al. (1973) expose a simple 
rule: The fewer factors, the simpler the hypotheses. Since simple hypotheses generally 
have logical scientific priority over more complex ones, hypotheses involving fewer 
factors are considered to be preferable to those involving more factors. That is, one 
accepts at least tentatively the simplest hypothesis (i.e. involving the fewest factors) 
that is not clearly contradicted by the set of observed correlations. So that the clearer 
the true factor structure, the smaller the sample size needed to discover it. Thus, the 
rules about number of variables are different for factor analysis than for regression, 
i.e. it is perfectly acknowledged to have many more variables than cases. In fact, the 
more variables the better as long as the variables remain relevant to the underlying 
factor. Regarding the number of factors to be selected, we will display model-
selection criteria, the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) information criteria.
6 We 
will also run maximum-likelihood tests. Each model will be estimated using 
maximum likelihood, and thus will permit to select the best Log likelihood ratio. We 
will also display the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy that permits 
                                                
6 AIC and BIC information criteria are generally used to compare alternative models. These criteria 
penalize models with additional parameters. The AIC is defined as (-2*log-likelihood + 2*number of 
parameters) and the BIC as (-2*log-likelihood + number of parameters * number of observations). 
Comparing models permit to order selection criteria based on parsimony. 14
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to discriminate whether overall variables have enough in common to warrant a factor 
analysis.
7
The second constraint in dealing with the geopolitical importance of a country is 
related to the fact that one should not only take into account the geopolitical 
importance of this country, but rather its importance and the importance of its 
neighbours, i.e. its geographical position. Indeed, while dealing with geopolitics, one 
should not omit the importance of the region and the importance of geographic 
relations between states. For example, one could not ignore the geopolitical 
importance of Turkey given by its geographical situation between Europe and the 
Middle-East. Keeping this in mind, we attempt to deal with this inconvenience by 
proposing an additional statistical analysis of the geopolitical determinants, namely a 
potential analysis. We bring together the concept of geopolitical importance of states 
and the potential analysis taken from International Economics. Generally, in the 
location decision analysis (of FDI for example), a variable labelled market potential is 
presented. This idea is related to Harris' (1954) influential market-potential function, 
which states that the demand for goods produced in a location is the sum of 
purchasing power in other locations, weighted by transport costs. The concept was 
later strengthened by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) stating that nominal 
wages are higher near concentrations of consumer and industrial demand (Hanson, 
2005). In this paper, we adapt this concept adding to country’s factor the scores of its 
neighbours to their distance. By doing so, we are able to catch both the geopolitical 
importance of a particular country and also its geopolitical importance given its 











where it gp  is the geopolitical potential of country i, it gf  is the geopolitical factor of 
country i as calculated in (2)  and  ji d  the relative distance in kilometres between 
country j and i. However, due to (i) the large number of countries in our database and 
(ii) the weak magnitude of the factors compared to that of the bilateral distance, (3) is 
expected to be correlated to (2). Therefore, we compute (3) without taking into 
                                                
7 The KMO measure of “fit” is an index for comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation 
coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients. 15
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account the geopolitical factor of the borrowing country but only the weighted sum of 








Anticipating next section in which define our factor, we perform a pairwise 
correlation tests between  it gf  and  it gp  and between  it gp  and  it gpf  to confirm that 
correlation levels are 0.46 and 0.99 respectively, significant at the 1% level (Cf. table 
1).








Geopolitical potential 0.4617 1.000
Pure geopolitical potential 0.4095 0.9966 1.000
3.2 Variables entering the geopolitical factor 
Variables proxying the geopolitical importance of countries may be classified in 4 
areas as follow: (i) the energetic, (ii) the nuclear, (iii) the military and (iv) the 
geographical areas. 
3.2.1 Energetic area 
Capturing the relative importance of land power refers directly to energetic 
resources. Of course, many resources might be useful in building a geopolitical factor, 
but we are here interested in resources that are/might be strategic since we are 
searching for potential power.
8 In this case, oil and gas resources appear to be 
fundamental. For example, Rose (2007) uses oil and gas proven reserves as proxies of 
geopolitical importance of country in a gravity equation to study bilateral trade. 
Moreover, more than 90% of world’s energetic rent comes from oil and gas (Eifert et 
                                                
8 A general concern has also been to include variables proxying the geopolitical importance of 
countries that do not influence temporaneous the economy, i.e. to escape endogenoeity issues when 
turning to the econometric modelling. 16
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al., 2003). In that spirit, we use the data on oil and gas proven reserves, rather than 
actual oil and gas production, to capture countries’ potential rent as we argued above 
that what matters is rather the (unexploited) potential. One needs also to take into 
account, for strategic purposes, the country’s ability to transport these resources. 
Indeed, it is sometimes the case that a country is geopolitically important not because 
it owns large resources but because they need to transit via this country to be 
exported. Therefore, we use also oil and gas pipelines since they are expected to 
proxy countries’ ability to transport energy for internal or external purposes. 
We expect the endowment in reserves and pipelines to influence positively in the 
probability of obtaining IMF money. Indeed, regarding oil reserves, we rely on related 
literature, in particular Harrigan et al. (2006), advocating that countries with larger oil 
and gas reserves receive substantially more financial support since IMF creditors may 
be interested in exploiting these resources. Finally, we expect the possession of large 
pipelines infrastructures to increase the probability of obtaining an IMF loan since 
they facilitate the transportation of national or foreign resources, and therefore should 
be subject to protection or to appropriation. 
3.2.2 Nuclear area
After having proxied countries’ energetic importance, we should also take into 
account countries’ endowment in nuclear energy. Indeed, Mussa (1999) provided 
quite a clear answer to whether one should take into account nuclear power of 
countries by writing that "many thought that Russia was too important - too nuclear - 
to be allowed to fail". What makes this resource special is that it is at the cross-section 
between energetic and military powers. Therefore, we computed a variable accounting 
for the size of civil nuclear capacity and a dummy variable to capture whether a 
country has the nuclear weapon. 
The impact of these variables on the probability to obtain an IMF loan is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the non allocation of an IMF loan may be seen by 
dominant countries willing to retain their position as a tool to counteract the rising 
power of nuclear powers. On the other hand, the international community may be 
interested in ensuring the economic stability of nuclear powers in order to reduce the 
risk that they use their weapons. Additionally, the possession of nuclear weapons may 
increase countries’ bargaining power in the international arena, and therefore their 
ability to “lobby” to obtain an IMF loan. Jo and Gartzke (2007) study the 
determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation and found that signatories to the Treaty 17
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on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are less likely to initiate nuclear 
weapons programs, but that has not deterred proliferation at the system level. 
Moreover, they found that the United States hegemony has the potential to encourage 
nuclear proliferation since the US appears much more willing to intervene, advocating 
in our case for a positive relation between the allocation of loans and the nuclear 
capacity of countries. 
3.2.3 Military power
Within the notion of geopolitics lies the concept of military power. Indeed, at its 
very start, the discipline gained attention largely through the work of Sir Halford 
Mackinder and his formulation of the Heartland Theory in 1904. This theory 
hypothesized the possibility for a huge empire to be brought into existence which did 
not need to use coastal or transoceanic transport to supply its military industrial 
complex, and that this empire could not be defeated by all the rest of the world 
coalitioned against it.
9 To proxy the military importance of countries, we use three 
variables: First, we needed to proxy the military potential of a country for domestic 
and regional purposes. A first indicator could be the number of local soldiers or even 
a proxy of the military budget. However, as we already mentioned one of our concern 
is to include variables that do not influence temporaneous the economy. In this spirit, 
we collected the number of US soldiers established in the borrowing country. We 
focus only on the US army because of its global military importance and because the 
US dominates the Fund’s decision making process (as exposed in the previous 
section). Second, we needed to control for conflicts and the deployment of 
multilateral forces since conflicts usually deter inflows of aids to the country. For 
instance, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) found a significant and negative sign of a 
variable equal to 1 if war during which more than 1000 people died has occurred 
when explaining the amount of UN foreign aid. We collected therefore the United 
Nation Peacekeeping military strengths established in the borrowing country. Third 
and lastly, we built a weighted index of countries’ involvement in Non-Proliferation 
Treaties (NPT) in order to provide a measure of the international “good willing”. We 
constructed this index by collecting data for all the international Treaties (13), 
excluding regional ones. If a country has implemented a Treaty, then it is coded 1, 0 
otherwise. To appreciate the proximity between each country and the International 
                                                
9 Nye (1990) also argues that ability to win a war is the historic source of power. Military power is still 
a factor explaining power in spite of the rise of other factors such that economic growth or technology. 18
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Community, we weight each Treaty, year by year, by its relative importance. The 
latter is given by the number of depositors (implementation of the Treaty) divided by 
the total number of depositors for all NPT. Therefore, the more a Treaty has been 
implemented by other countries, the more it contributes to the index. For example, the 
Geneva Protocol, created in 1925, has a weight of almost 16.5% in the index in 1990. 
The Mine Ban Convention, signed in 1997 (so it has no weight for the first 7 years of 
the data) has a weight of 9.9% at the end of the period. However, the Geneva protocol 
weight has lost 7 percentage points in 1997. Moreover, the NPT related to nuclear 
weapon loses less weight than the Geneva protocol does (from 19% to 13%). Finally, 
the weight of some Treaties like the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention 
present at the beginning of the period has increased at the end of the period, thus 
implying there is not a bias in favour of recently created Treaties. 
We expect IMF loans to be positively correlated with these military factors. Indeed, 
the US troops variable exhibits the geopolitical importance for the US, and thus for an 
important number of US allies (El Kathib and Le Billon, 2004). We expect the US 
and its military allies to influence loan decisions in order to favour countries where 
their troops are present. Regarding the NPT index, the effect of the variable relating to 
NPT is more ambiguous. On the one hand, signing such treaties signals countries’ 
cooperative behaviour and submission to an “international rule of law” which may 
impact positively on the odds of obtaining an IMF loan. On the other hand, their 
participation in such a treaty reduces their threat to the world. In this context the 
international community may be less interested in ensuring the economic stability of 
such countries through the concession of an IMF program. Finally, we have no 
predefined expectations regarding the UN strength proxy since this variables is more a 
control variables than a determinant.  
3.2.4 Geographic area
Finally, we also need to take into account the pure geographic characteristics of 
countries. In this part, we use traditional proxies of geographic importance of 
countries (see among others Ades and Chua, 1997; Van Houtum, 2005; Bernholz, 
2006): The area in kilometre squared to proxy the physical size of the country. To 
proxy whether the country is not just filed with deserts or mountains and if this 
country has important transportation capacities, we collected the length of the roads 
and the length of the coast lines. Finally, and central to the geopolitical analysis, we 
also use the number of borders to appreciate the centrality of countries. All these 19
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variables are supposed to capture size as well as geographic determinants of 
transportation ability within the country. They are thus all expected to influence 
positively on the probability to receive IMF loans. 
3.3 Description of variables entering the geopolitical factor and outcome of the 
factor analysis 
Units and the sources of collected data entering the factor analysis are reported in 
Table 2 below. Table 3 reports the outcome of the factor analysis and the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy to determine the fit of our factor 
regarding variables entering the sample. We also report in table 3 a column with 
correlation of the variables with the factor. Not surprisingly, the only variable poorly 
correlated is the UN military strength variable as discussed before. The KMO fit is 
rather good and is classified as ‘meritorious’ with a value over 0.8, from a scale 
ranging from 0 to 1. Finally, we also report Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) 
information criteria (see table 4). They both, together with the Eigen values, advocate 
for the use of a single factor. Not reported here, we also ran maximum-likelihood tests 
on the adequate number of factors. The latter suggests that a one factor model 
provides an adequate model and will therefore represent what we call the geopolitical 
factor of countries. 20
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4. Data and methodological issues 
4.1 The data: description of the independent and dependent variables 
4.1.1 Independent variables 
Variables entering the geopolitical factor, the geopolitical potential and the pure 
geopolitical potential have been described in the previous section. When estimating 
the probability of receiving IMF loans and the determinants of the size of these loans, 
one should control for economic and political determinants that have been identified 
as determinants of IMF lending in related studies. Sturm et al. (2005) used an Extreme 
Bound Analysis to discriminate between economic and political determinants of IMF 
loans using a panel model for 118 countries over the period 1971–2000. They found 
three robust economic variables explaining the distribution of IMF loans: The ratio of 
international reserves to imports of goods and services in current US$, the growth of 
real GDP and the log of GDP per capita at market prices. The ratio of total debt 
service to exports of goods and services is also found to be significant but to a lesser 
extent. We build therefore our baseline model upon their findings and include these 
variables in our estimations.
10 The expected sign of the reserves to imports ratio and 
the growth rates is negative since a low reserve to imports ratio increases the risk of 
meeting balance of payments difficulties and a country experiencing high growth rates 
is less subject to economic difficulties, respectively. Regarding the GDP per capita 
variable, a higher ratio means a higher level of economic development and therefore 
less need for financial support. Finally, the debt service to exports ratio is expected to 
be positively linked since a heavy debt burden relative to exports increases countries’ 
need for external finance to service that debt. All economic data are taken from the 
International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics database. 
To control for political factors influencing IMF lending decisions is an important 
robustness check to analyse the potential robustness of our measure of geopolitical 
importance. Indeed, the recent empirical studies on political influences on the IMF 
have shown that countries voting with the US in the UN General Assembly receive 
better treatment from the IMF (Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher and Sturm, 2006; Dreher, 
Sturm and Vreeland, 2006; Dreher, Marchesi and Vreeland, 2007) since Kuziemko 
and Werker (2006) have recently demonstrated that the pattern of US aid payments to 
                                                
10 We have also run our estimations with additional economic variables (current account balance and 
total external debt) but too many observations were lost due to the lack of data. They are available upon 
request to the authors. 23
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rotating members of the UN council is consistent with vote buying. They argued that 
non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council receive extra foreign aid from 
the United States and the United Nations, especially during years when the attention 
focused on the council is greatest. Relying on the data used by Dreher and Sturm 
(2006), we introduce several definitions of alignment of countries within the UN 
assembly to US, France, the UK and more broadly the G-7 countries as a group. We 
also include a dummy controlling for temporary membership in the UN Security 
Council as in Kuziemko and Werker (2006) for the US and Dreher, Sturm and 
Vreeland (2006) for the IMF. 
Moreover, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Dreher and Vaubel (2004) study the 
allocation of an IMF loan around election time and found significant results. The 
former suggest that governments are more likely to enter an agreement early in the 
election term, hoping that any perceived stigma of signing an agreement will be 
forgiven or forgotten before the next elections. In other words, demand for IMF credit 
might be higher after election years. Dreher and Vaubel (2004) suggest that the 
availability of IMF credit might indirectly help to finance electoral campaigns. 
Finally, two dimensions are to be taken into account. First, Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) and Bird and Rowlands (2000) argued that countries with more unstable and 
polarized political systems will have more difficulties to arrange a credible adjustment 
program and will, therefore, have a higher incentive to turn to the Fund. They also 
suggest that the IMF could prefer lending in general to countries with good 
governance. These results are confirmed by the analysis of Sturm et al. (2005). We 
include therefore different proxy of government stability, political opposition and 
government fractionization of political power using the database of Political 
Institutions of the World Bank.
11 Second, IMF loans have been found to be rather 
persistent (Bird, 1996; IEO/IMF, 2002), i.e. the likelihood of an additional loan could 
be determined in part by past loans. We therefore capture this high degree of 
persistence in IMF involvement as in the related literature (see between others 
Przeworki and Vreeland, 2000, Hutchison and Noy, 2003; Sturm et al., 2005) using 
the lag of a 3-year moving average of a dummy indicating whether or not a country 
was under an agreement. 
                                                
11 Government stability counts the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any given 
year. Political opposition records the total vote share of all opposition parties. Finally, government 
fractionization is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government 
parties will be of different parties (World Bank, DPI2006). 24
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4.1.2 Dependent variables 
IMF loans are granted to ease the adjustment policies and reforms that a country 
must make to correct its balance of payments problem and restore conditions for 
strong economic growth. They are mainly provided under an "arrangement", which 
stipulates the specific policies and measures a country has agreed to implement to 
resolve its balance of payments problem. The economic program is presented to the 
Fund's Executive Board in a Letter of Intent. Over the years, the IMF has developed 
various facilities to address the specific circumstances of its diverse membership. 
More specifically, IMF finance is divided into two resources account: First, the 
concessional loans allow low-income countries to borrow through the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). 
Second, non-concessional loans are provided mainly through Stand-By Arrangements 
(SBA), and occasionally using the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF), and the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). The IMF 
also provides emergency assistance to support recovery from natural disasters and 
conflicts, in some cases at concessional interest rates. Except for the PRGF and the 
ESF, all facilities are subject to the IMF's market-related interest rate and some carry 
a surcharge (mainly for large loans). The rate of charge is based on the Special 
Drawing Rights interest rate, which is revised weekly to take account of changes in 
short-term interest rates in major international money markets. The amount that a 
country can borrow from the Fund varies depending on the type of loan, but is 
typically a multiple of the country's quota. The limit is fixed according to the Articles 
of Agreements to 100% of the quota per year and 300% on a cumulative basis of 3 
years regarding the SBA for example. Of course, these limits can be extended in 
special occasions. For example, South Korea and Turkey got more than 1500% of 
their quota during financial distress, respectively in 1997 and in 1999/2000. 
Since we focus on lending and given that industrial countries have not made use of 
the Fund’s financial support for the last three decades, our panel comprises 107 IMF 
developing and emerging economies over the period 1990-2003 sampled at the yearly 
frequency.
12 299 agreements have been agreed accounting for over 237,633,199 
thousands of SDR and 255 agreements have been drawn accounting for over 
160,956,076 thousands of SDRs. Table 5 below shows descriptive statistics for our 
                                                
12 While some related studies used a longer time frame, our sample starts in 1990 to limit potential 
structural breaks before the 1990s. 25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 965
November 2008
dependent variables. Overall, agreements are slightly equally distributed between 
SBA and PRGF, 46% and 42% of total loans respectively as shown in Chart 1 (in 
bars) below.  However, looking at the amount lent, Chart 1 (in lines) exhibits the 
sheer size of SBA compared to PRGF. Indeed, SBA represent more than 80% of total 
amount, compared to 6% for PRGF. This distinction has some economic bases since 
PRGF are oriented to support low-income countries, and therefore their needs are 
much less important than emerging markets. Interestingly however, the amount and 
the number of PRGF are increasing over time. We will therefore focus on SBA and 
EFF for non-concessional loans and on PRGF for concessional ones given their sheer 
size. Finally, looking at the regional distribution of loans is also quite informative. 
Table 6 below represents the percentage of numbers of SBA (in black) and of PRGF 
(in grey) to total IMF loans per region over our sample period. Interestingly, we 
notice that the bulk of SBA drawn are in direction of Europe (including Turkey), Asia 
and South America, whereas PRGF drawn are mainly oriented to support African 
countries. 
Our dependent variables are therefore constructed as the ratio of the amount of IMF 
loans agreed to the borrowing country’s quota. The data were retrieved from the IMF 
website which recently made available online an increased level of data on financial 
agreements. 26
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Table 6: Geographical location of the recipient countries 
SBA/ EFF PRGF SBA/ EFF PRGF
Africa 21.3% 62.5% 2.1% 51.7%
Asia 7.8% 14.4% 18.4% 33.9%
Eastern Europe 29.1% 14.4% 13.5% 7.8%
Middle East 5.7% 0.0% 13.6% 0.0%
South America 36.2% 8.7% 52.4% 6.6%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Programs Amounts
Region
4.2 Methodology issues 
Our panel is unbalanced with a total of 1523 observations. As described above, our 
dependent variables are by definition left censored to 0 and uncensored on the ‘right 
side’. This calls for a censored regression model such as the Tobit estimator. The 
model is therefore specified hereafter, as in Barro and Lee (2005):  
* * it it it t it LX G T D EGJ P      (5)
* max 0, it it LL ªº   ¬¼ (6)
where the dependent variable, Lit,, is the loan-size variable for country i during 
period t. Lit=0 if the country did not have a loan agreement with the IMF during 
period t. The vector  it X  denotes the country-specific economic macro-aggregates that 
influence the existence and size of IMF programs. As discussed before, this vector 
includes the ratio of foreign reserves to imports, debt service to exports, per capita 
GDP and GDP growth. The regression also includes time dummies to control for 
common effects of external factors such as world interest rates.  it G  contains the 
measures of country’s geopolitical importance as discussed in section 3. It includes: 
First, the geopolitical factor of countries  it gf ; second, their geopolitical potential  it gp
and pure geopolitical potential  it gpf . Finally, the variable  it P  is a random error term. 
Equation (5) can be viewed as a reduced-form model for IMF loans from a debtor’s 
perspective. To minimize reverse-causality problems, all explanatory variables are 
measured as lagged values. Some variables enter as their log values to deliver the best 29
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goodness-of-fit.
13 Moreover, we use random-effects specifications for the error term 
since the probability that a country is favoured by the IMF during one period is likely 
to be persistent over time, i.e. there is great deal of recidivism in IMF lending 
practices as argued by Bird (1996). This assumption is supported by econometrical 
tests shown in the last section of the paper. Finally, the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test indicates that for SBA, our sample shows some 
heteroskedasticity. We may therefore produce robust variance estimates of marginal 
effects.
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Core results 
Core results are shown in table 7. In each table, we estimate separately models of 
supply for agreed and drawn amounts of SBA/EFF and PRGF. Due to missing 
observations in some explanatory variables, our estimations cover generally 98 out of 
the 107 countries in our sample. We extend our sample back to 107 countries in the 
robustness section below. Regarding the economic model (odd columns) for 
SBA/EFF, countries experiencing relatively weak growth in real GDP are found to 
receive more credit as expected. Indeed, the estimated parameters are found 
significant at the 1% level and negative for SBA/EFF as in Sturm et al. (2005).
Moreover, the positive relation between IMF lending and GDP per capita may reflect 
the Fund’s reluctance to provide stabilization loans to countries that are not 
creditworthy (Barro and Lee, 2005). As argued by Knight and Santaella (1997), 
countries experiencing relatively low levels of international reserves relative to 
imports are found to receive more IMF credit. Indeed, these countries will be less able 
to meet balance of payments difficulties through reserves use. Finally, a heavy debt 
burden relative to exports increases countries’ probability to be financially supported 
to service that debt. As in Rowlands (1995), we found this estimated parameter 
significantly and positively related for SBA/EFF. 
The picture is however reversed and less robust for the PRGF, at least for GDP 
growth and per capita GDP. Indeed, the parameter estimated of per capita GDP is 
significant and negative. In accordance to Knight and Santaella (1997), we find that 
poor countries are more likely to be financially supported. Indeed, these countries 
                                                
13 The results are not sensitive to the specific values added for the log transformations. 30
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have limited access to private international capital markets and are also small 
recipients of bilateral aid. Interestingly, we find that GDP growth is significant with a 
positive sign. Harrigan et al. (2006) found the similar result without explaining it. We 
argue that since access to PRGF is mainly granted to compensate the small amount of 
bilateral aid flows and is therefore mainly conditioned to a certain level of GDP per 
capita; since PRGF are concessional and account for small amount compare to 
SBA/EFF, these loans are granted more easily once the country has been designated 
as eligible. 
Although the above economic model provides useful insights into the determinants 
of IMF programs, its explanatory power may be improved including variables 
capturing countries’ geopolitical importance as argued by IMF staff (see citations 
above). Our factor  it gf  is found to be significant at the 1% level and positively related 
to SBA/EFF, whereas it is significant at the 10% level and negatively related to 
PRGF. Therefore, our results exhibit that the IMF Executive Board is favouring 
geopolitically important countries when lending through non-concessional facilities, 
and favouring non-geopolitically important countries when lending via concessional 
ones, although the later is not fully robust. The results for the supplemented models 
show a strong improvement of the explanatory power of the estimations. 31
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As described above, we constructed a different way to estimate  it G  using our 
geopolitical potential analysis. Indeed, we argue that one should not only take into 
account the geopolitical importance of a country, but also its geographical importance. 
We introduce  it gp  in (5) and the results are, in many respects, similar to those found 
in the previous table. Even columns of table 8 show the result of our model using the 
geopolitical potential of countries
Another concern in this paper is to follow the international trade literature 
concerning the geopolitical factor. The method of calculation of the internal distance 
is problematic and depending of it, this may introduce a bias in the potential. 
Therefore, this could explain the fact that the geopolitical potential is less significant 
than the geopolitical factor. Dividing each country’s geopolitical factor by its internal 
distance may affect the result since the factor analysis is bounded to an interval [-1.75, 
2.19] and country’s internal distance [13.84, 2754.81] in log terms. We therefore test 
also separately our measure of pure geopolitical potential, gpfi, on top of our 
geopolitical factor, gfi. They are robust for SBA/EFF while the levels of significance 
of our geopolitical proxies are decreased for the PRGF estimation. We investigate in 
the next section other possible explanations. 
What arises from our core results is the fact that countries that are geopolitically 
important are favoured by the IMF when loans are non-concessional. We also find 
that concessional loans, i.e. PRGF, are granted to less geopolitically important 
countries, which could reflect the development objectives of these loans. As argued 
above, multilateral aid may be directed to less geopolitical countries to compensate 
the fact that they receive less bilateral aid. Therefore, this negative sign does not 
reflect the fact that the IMF wants to lend to not geopolitically important countries but 
rather that the PRGF eligible countries are not geopolitically important. 
5.2 Robustness checks 
5.2.1 On the importance of political factors 
As discussed in sections 2 and 4, related studies on political economy determinant of 
IMF loans found that IMF loan decisions are significantly influenced by political 
factors. We test these factors in this section adding to equation (5) Pit that comprises 
the proxies of political economy factors that have found to significantly influence the 
attribution of IMF loan as detailed in the previous section. 33
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it t it it it it T G P X L P J G F E D        *
* (7)
Table 8 below shows the results of multiple specifications including the correlation of 
the borrowing countries to the US in the UN General Assembly; dummy variables to 
account for a seat in the UN Security Council, post and pre elections periods; indexes 
capturing governments’ instability, the degree of political opposition and 
governments’ political fractionization. Finally, we pool together these determinants in 
the last column of the table 8 to test for their robustness. 
The results are in line with the related studies. Indeed, voting in line with the US in 
the UN Assembly appears to be the most important political factor shaping IMF loan 
decision. Holding a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council is also positively 
related to the probability to get IMF money but appears to be less robust. Entering a 
program after, but not before elections is also found to be significant. Interestingly, 
factors capturing the degree of political stability influence rather more PRGF than 
SBA/EFF. Overall, our geopolitical factor shows robust significant estimated 
coefficients, empathising that we are not capturing political factors within our 
geopolitical factor. 34
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5.2.2 On the importance of factors explaining aid flows 
Since PRGF are multilateral aid agreements, we might also test for the importance of 
relevant determinants put forward in the aid literature. Burnside and Dollar (2000) for 
example, found that the level of democracy and corruption in the recipient countries, 
as well as the former colonial link between countries are strong determinants of 
bilateral aid decisions. However, they also found that these results are not robust for 
multilateral aid flows. As in the previous section, we added in equation (5) these 
proxies in  it A  as follows:  
it t it it it it T G A X L P J G O E D        *
* (8)
Table 9 below show the results of our model including these variables independently 
and pooled altogether. 
In accordance with the findings of Burnside and Dollar, we found that these factors do 
not influence significantly PRGF decisions. Only the level of democracy index is 
found to be significant in our models. This is not surprising given that, contrary to 
bilateral aid, aid managed on a multilateral basis is rather allocated in favour of good 
policy according to Bursnide and Dollar (2000). Once again, our geopolitical factor is 
found to be robust and shows significant estimated coefficients for SBA/EFF and still 
to a lesser extent for PRGF. 
5.2.3 On the importance of recidivism 
As discussed in section 4, SBA/EFF are found to be rather persistent. Therefore, we 
tested this in our specification by introducing a 3-year moving average of a dummy 
indicating whether or not a country was under an agreement following Przeworki and 
Vreeland (2000). Results are reported in table 10 below. The dummy is found to be 
significant indicating that there is some degree of persistence in IMF loan decision. 
Moreover, we also estimated a probit dynamic specification using the model 
developed by Stewart (2007).
14 His estimator control for the initial conditions 
problem proposed by Heckman (1981) involves specifying a linearised approximation 
to the reduced form equation for the initial value of the latent  
                                                
14 The dependent variable is therefore coded 1 when the country signs an agreement and 0 when there 
is no loan. 36
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variable.
15 In both cases, our index of geopolitical importance was still found to be 
robustly significant. These results do not alter our benchmark model as we 
accordingly use a random effect specification, but one has to bear in mind the 
importance of recidivism in IMF lending. 
Table 10: Robustness checks: Recidivism 
Tobit Dynamic probit
Growth of GDP -3.998 -1.009
(3.34)*** (2.14)**
Log of GDP per capita 0.807 0.191
(3.46)*** (2.19)**
FX reserves to imports -1.125 -1.059
(1.83)* (2.33)**
Debt service 3.263 0.885
(2.83)*** (1.56)
Geopolitical factor: gf 0.453 0.241
(2.91)*** (2.11)**
Recividism: 3-year lag  0.924 0.358





A bsolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable /                    
Explanatory variable
Stand-by Agreements agreed               
(dummy: 1 for loan agreement, 0 otherwise)
5.2.4 On the factor analysis: Testing the variables entering the factor 
In further robustness checks, we test the adequacy of our factor analysis. This may 
be done by testing the robustness of the factor itself regarding the variables entering it 
and by computing the factor using another technique. The latter will be tested in the 
next sub-section. We focus here on the variables entering the factor analysis. First, 
table 11 below shows the results of estimations where all the geopolitical variables 
entering the factor are tested separately. Regarding the top panel on SBA, all 
variables, except UN military strength, are significant and positively linked to the 
decision and the amount to lend through SBA/EFF. This reinforces the robustness of 
                                                
15 There is an issue in modelling IMF lending as a two-stage process for which a selection model may 
be more appropriate. We did test for this using a two-stage Heckman selection model. However, the 
Likelihood Ratio test of independence of equations is rejected meaning that the model is poorly 
identified. This question needs more investigation as no identification strategy has yet clearly emerged 
in the related literature. 38
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the use of a factor analysis. Indeed, the fact that all variables taking one by one are 
significant and that when these levels of significance decrease when pooling them 
together (see last columns of table 11) advocates for the use of the factor analysis to 
proxy the unobserved geopolitical importance of countries. Regarding the bottom 
panel of PRGF, results are less significant. This is non-surprising since the 
significance of our factor is less robust for PRGF as discussed above. The only 
significant variables are the oil reserves (in the bottom right and left parts), nuclear 
plant and nuclear weapon (only for the amount drawn). This suggests that when we 
say that the IMF tends to favoured less geopolitical important countries when lending 
through the PRGF resources, the Fund lend to countries with small endowment in 
resource, which is in line with its development objective, and without the nuclear civil 
and military power. In the latter case, one might argue that the IMF is willing to lend 
to countries that do not represent a nuclear threat, but one should also take into 
account that poor countries are less likely to be enough economically developed to 
build up nuclear power. We can in this case cite the interesting example of Pakistan 
which is a large recipient of PRGF and possesses both civil and military nuclear 
powers. Yet, Pakistan is the only country receiving both SBA/EFF and PRGF over the 
period.
Another robustness check consists in taking out variables, one by one, of the sample 
during the computation process of the factor analysis and by doing the same but in 
taking out groups of variables. Table 12 and 13 below present the results of these 
checks respectively. In the first place, variables are taken out one by one in the 
following order: Oil reserves, gas reserves, oil pipelines, gas pipelines, civil nuclear 
power plants, possession of nuclear weapon(s), US troops presence in the country, UN 
military strength in the country, NPT index, coastlines, area, lengths of roads and the 
number of borders. Results are robust to the different specifications for SBA/EFF and 
show more volatile significance for PRGF as pointed out in the preceding sub-section. 
Regarding the latter, results are non-surprisingly stronger when dealing with energetic 
and nuclear powers as shown in table 16 in which variables are, in a second place, 
taken out by groups organized as the following: Energetic, nuclear, military and 
geographic variables. Both tables reinforce the robustness of the construction of our 
factor analysis. 39
ECB



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 965
November 2008
Table 13: Robustness checks on groups of variables in the factor
PFR1 PFR2 PFR3 PFR4 PFR1 PFR2 PFR3 PFR4
Growth of GDP -4.302 -4.340 -4.318 -4.335 1.856 1.892 1.889 1.893
(4.07)*** (4.12)*** (4.08)*** (4.07)*** (2.86)*** (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.84)***
Log of GDP per capita 1.011 0.920 0.913 0.859 -0.807 -0.773 -0.769 -0.757
(5.22)*** (5.04)*** (4.99)*** (4.72)*** (12.21)*** (10.58)*** (10.51)*** (9.50)***
FX reserves to imports -1.133 -1.109 -1.089 -0.987 -0.801 -0.830 -0.827 -0.834
(2.23)** (2.13)** (2.11)** (1.98)** (1.96)** (2.04)** (2.03)** (2.06)**
Debt service 3.158 3.475 3.444 3.661 0.823 0.806 0.810 0.803
(2.63)*** (2.78)*** (2.77)*** (2.87)*** (1.76)* (1.72)* (1.73)* (1.71)*
Geopolitical factor
a 0.564 0.535 0.543 0.528 -0.184 -0.146 -0.157 -0.152
(3.94)*** (3.34)*** (3.55)*** (3.31)*** (1.75)* (1.58) (1.67)* (1.51)
Constant -10.264 -9.680 -9.618 -9.844 2.589 2.337 2.302 1.114
(5.18)*** (5.10)*** (5.05)*** (4.92)*** (4.56)*** (3.92)*** (3.84)*** (1.24)
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo-R² for Tobit estimations 0.1057 0.1031 0.1039 0.1020 0.1553 0.1546 0.1549 0.1546
Observations 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163
Countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Interval regression estimator - Marginal effect reported - Robust absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Bartlett scoring method
b Using different variables in the factor analysis:
PFR1: all variables ex cept the energy ones
PFR2: all variables except the nuclear ones
PFR3: all variables except the military ones
PFR4: all variables except the geographic ones
Facilities to quota (%)
Stand-by A greements to quota (%) Poverty Reduction and Growth 44
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6. Conclusions 
In this study, we have developed a conceptual framework to explain how and why 
geopolitics can be present and can have some influence over loan decisions and sizes 
in the International Monetary Fund. By introducing a new concept, the geopolitical 
potential, and a method yet unused in this literature, we intended to find evidence that 
country's geopolitical importance influence IMF loan decisions. Since the geopolitical 
importance of states is unobservable, we used in a first step a factor analysis. In a 
second step, we introduce the concept of geopolitical potential to capture the 
geopolitical importance of the borrowing country accounting also for its geographical 
location. The impact of the geopolitical factor and the geopolitical potential is also 
differentiated according to whether the Fund lend through concessional facilities 
(Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)) and non-concessional facilities 
supported by the General Resources Account (GRA), focusing on Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBAs), which are the most important facilities funded by the GRA. 
Our results shed light on how geopolitics may influence the Fund lending practices. 
Economic determinants are still valid for both facilities and turn out to influence more 
for SBA. This is in a sense a reassuring result regarding the management of IMF 
funds, since SBA represent more than 80% of total IMF lending. More importantly, 
our geopolitical factor and potential are strong determinants of IMF loans. They 
however influence the probability to sign a SBA and a PRGF differently. Indeed, the 
Fund favoured geopolitically important countries through SBA, while countries 
receiving PRGF seem not to be selected according to their geopolitical importance. 
These results are robust when controlling for political determinants as well as to 
different econometric specifications. 
To conclude, we do not intend to provide a judgmental analysis on whether the IMF 
should favour geopolitically important countries. However, the conclusions of our 
analysis may question the positive externalities of conditionality since the decision to 
lend non-concessional loans, i.e. through SBA/EFF, is influenced not only by 
economics factors, but also geopolitical ones. 
Furthermore, we believe that geopolitics may also influence other international 
organizations, such as the World Bank. This constitutes therefore an interesting path 
to expand this work. 45
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